Abstract-The ability to transmit a message securely in the presence of eavesdroppers in a dense wireless network is considered. As with a number of recent schemes, system nodes other than the transmitter and receiver are chosen to generate noise that confuses the eavesdropper. By exploiting the dynamics of the fading, significantly improved performance is achieved beyond that generated from the standard multi-user diversity gain expected from opportunistic relaying. In particular, the node with the best fading characteristics takes responsibility for message relaying, while those whose fading will significantly reduce their impact on the desired communication play the role of noise generators. For a source transmitting to a destination using a set of intermediate relays, we consider the number of eavesdroppers that can be present without the interception of packets, in both the case where the eavesdroppers operate independently and in the case where they collude. The latter case also encompasses the more likely scenario of a single eavesdropper with a sophisticated receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
The secure transmission of a message from a sender Alice to a receiver Bob in the presence of an adversary Eve, who may be a passive listener and/or an active jammer, is a major concern in modern networks. At first glance, wireless communication systems appear to make the problem more challenging because the range of locations for which an eavesdropper can gain access to the transmitted signal is increased. But there can be a number of advantages versus the wired scenario, because, unlike the standard cryptographic framework, the signal observed by Bob and Eve is not the same. These advantages include, among others, key generation that exploits the common information in the fading channel characteristics (e.g. [8] ), and exploiting independent packet loss of Eve and Bob [9] .
We consider an approach that exploits the differences in the channels from a number of relays to the receiver and to the eavesdroppers (without knowledge of the channel to the eavesdroppers) to achieve an advantage for Bob over Eve. Depending on the application, level of security required, and assumptions on the eavesdropper's location or capabilities, this could be used outright for security, but we view it as more likely that it will be used to enhance the physical layer for schemes that are dependent on packet losses at Eve [9] .
The idea proposed here fits into the recent set of techniques that employ artificial noise, where system nodes put noise into the air to confuse the eavesdropper. Many of these investigations have considered the secrecy capacity in a single-relay system (see [3] and references therein), where it has been demonstrated that even a relay without knowledge of the message can have utility [4] . Of more pertinent interest are the class of techniques that can be traced back to [2] , [6] . In [6] , a transmitter with multiple antennas beamforms towards the intended receiver while generating random noise in the nullspace of the receiver so as to confuse the eavesdropper. When the multiple-antenna transmitter is instead replaced by a single-antenna transmitter and a number of singleantenna available relay nodes, a two-stage process that exploits interference cancellation at the receiver allows for artificial noise to impinge on the eavesdropper that can be canceled at the receiver.
There have been numerous related works to [2] , [6] in recent years, but, to our knowledge, none of these have exploited the multi-user diversity effect to arrive at a simple, implementable, protocol that: (1) does not require knowledge of the eavesdropper channel, (2) does not require distributed beamforming, and (3) does not require interference cancellation. The protocol, which will be described in detail below in Section II, uses an enhanced form of multi-user diversity. A relay node with "good" links to the source and destination relays the information. In addition, relay nodes with "bad" channels to the relay or destination produce random jamming in the appropriate transmission phase to confuse potential passive eavesdroppers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system assumptions and protocol. Section III considers the resulting advantage for Bob over Eve. Conclusions are presented in Section V.
Fig. 1. System scenario: Source node S wishes to communicate securely with destination node D with the assistance of intervening system nodes R 0 , R 1 , · · · , R n−1 (n = 5 in the figure) in the presence of passive eavesdroppers E 0 , E 1 , · · · , E m−1 of unknown locations (m = 5 in the figure).
II. MODEL AND PROTOCOL

A. Model
Consider Figure 1 , where a source node S wishes to transmit to a destination node D with the assistance of nodes R 0 , R 1 , . . . R n−1 . Also present in the environment are m passive eavesdroppers 1 E 0 , · · · , E m−1 . We consider here equal path loss between each pair of nodes, reserving a more accurate path-loss model for the network case being studied in an upcoming work.
The i th transmitted symbol of the source S and a 1) Channel measurement between source S and relays: In Step 1, the source S broadcasts a pilot signal to allow each relay node to measure the channel from source S to itself. Each relay receives:
and the eavesdroppers receive
Recall that the destination cannot hear the source. We assume that each of the system nodes and eavesdroppers are able to perfectly measure the channel contained in their observation; that is, after
Step 1, system node R j , j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, now perfectly knows h S,Rj , and the eavesdropper E j , j = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1 perfectly knows h S,Ej . 2) Channel measurement between destination D and relays: Analogously to Step 1, the destination D broadcasts a pilot signal and each of the relays R j , j = 0, 1, . . . , n−1 measure h D,Rj . We assume that each eavesdropper E j , j = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1 perfectly knows h D,Ej . 3) Relay Selection: During Step 3, the relay with the largest min(|h S,Rj | 2 , |h D,Rj | 2 ) announces itself as the messaging relay using a distributed protocol. For instance, each relay picks a backoff window inversely proportional to min(|h S,Rj | 2 , |h D,Rj | 2 ). Denote the messaging relay's index by j * . We will assume perfect relay choice i.e. that the relay with the largest min(|h S,Rj | 2 , |h D,Rj | 2 ) is chosen. 4) Message Transmission from S to R j * : In Step 4, the source S transmits the message to R j * . Concurrently, intervening system nodes with indices in R 1 = {j = j * : |h Rj ,R j * | 2 < τ} transmit random noise in order to generate sufficient interference at the eavesdroppers. The messaging relay receives:
and eavesdropper E j , j = 0, 1, . . . , m−1 receives:
In a manner similar to Step 4, the messaging relay and intervening system nodes in R 2 = {j = j * : |h Rj ,D | 2 < τ} transmit. The signal received by the destination D and the eavesdroppers can be written in a manner similar to Step 4.
C. Limitations and Assumptions
Critical to the protocol, as with many wireless security protocols, is the ability to authenticate messages as coming from true system nodes as opposed to eavesdroppers during the system set-up. In addition, the two extra transmissions required for relay selection could help an adversary to detect a communication in the system. Potentially significant (depending on the choice of τ ) power is employed to enable security, although we hasten to note that the throughput of large wireless networks is interference-limited and not power-limited.
III. ANALYSIS
Motivated by the practical consideration of minimizing the number of packets Eve intercepts while maximizing the number of packets that Bob receives, we consider an outage metric for each. This might have direct application, or could be used as an underlying physical layer in a higher-level security scheme that derives its advantage from packet losses at Eve [9] . In addition, it is easily employed in conjunction with the information-theoretic concept of secrecy capacity. In particular, the calculations below are easily modified to account for separate signal-to-noise thresholds at each of the relay/receiver and the eavesdropper, in which case the secrecy rate corresponding to that pair of signal-tonoise thresholds is achieved with high probability in the presence of the eavesdroppers.
A source to destination broadcast is in outage if and only if either the S → R j * link or the R j * → D falls below the required signal-to-noise ratio γ for a given rate; that is,
A. Non-Collaborating Eavesdroppers
In contrast to the destination, we will assume the pessimistic case that each eavesdropper can hear both the source and relay transmission with equal average strength. Hence, each eavesdropper E j sees effectively two independent looks at the source message. Let C S,Ej denote the signal to noise and interference ratio (SINR) from source S to eavesdropper E j . Therefore,
We consider the analysis given an asymptotically large number of relays n. This is motivated by the connectivity condition for large wireless networks, where each node must have, on average, an infinite number of neighbors for the network to be connected with high probability. For any fixed threshold γ, multi-user diversity in the form of single or multiple relay selection without artificial noise is sufficient for P (S→D) out → 0 as n → ∞; however, the eavesdropper outage is invariant to n and non-zero. This could be remedied by letting γ go to infinity as n → ∞. For example, with γ = log log n, P
as n → ∞, but this would require infinite rate on each link. Artificial noise generation offers an alternate route that can be employed for fixed γ (or rate), γ > 1, and can suppress a large number of eavesdroppers, as demonstrated here.
Let P
S,E
out denote probability of the event E = (C S,E0 < γ ∧ · · · ∧ C S,Em < γ) i.e. the probability that none of the eavesdropper nodes exceeds the required signal-to-noise-plus-interference ratio γ.
Theorem 3.1: Consider the scenario of Figure 1 with the protocol of Section II-B with n available system nodes, and m(n) eavesdroppers. Let τ (n) denote the threshold used to determine the noise-generating nodes in the protocol of Section II-B. If
and τ (n) ≤ Es ln n−2Noγ 4nγ
, as given in (6), by:
where X = min{|h S,R j * | 2 , |h R j * ,D | 2 }. Now, with R j * as the relay with index j that maximizes 
a.s.. From Lemma 3.5, the random variable X = max(X 1 , · · · , X n ) converges almost surely to ln n/2.
In driving the P S→D out to 0, the choice of the threshold τ (n) is critical. For a relay node R j , the noise-generating probability is
τ (n), for small values of τ (n). Thus, the number |R 1 | of noise generating nodes is a binomial random variable with mean nτ (n). We can now use Chernoff bounds [5] [pp.67-70] to obtain bounds on the probability that |R 1 | deviates from its expectation. In particular,
Since nτ (n) → ∞ as n → ∞, we conclude that (n/2)τ (n) ≤ |R 1 | ≤ 2nτ (n) w.h.p. From the conditions on |R 1 | and τ (n), we get
w.h.p. In other words,
Substituting into (8) yields
It can be readily seen that P
for a given j. From Lemma 3.5, the maximum of the fading coefficients from the eavesdroppers to the source converges to ln m(n) a.s. From (7), the received SINR at eavesdropper E j is upper bounded by:
We have shown
Hence, we can therefore replace the sum in the denominator of (4) with an nτ (n)/2-stage Erlang random variable yielding:
Conditioned on |R 1 |, |R 2 | ≥ nτ (n)/2 and from the conditions for m(n), we obtain
Therefore,
We next show that the sum
w.h.p. Using Chernoff bounds for an n-stage Erlang random variable with mean E[X] = n derived in Appendix A, we can conclude that:
It can be verified that
For γ > 1, the right hand side of the above inequality goes to 0, as n → ∞. Therefore,
By symmetry, P C S,Ej < γ | |R 1 |, |R 2 | ≥ nτ (n)/2 is the same for all eavesdropper nodes. Using the union bound, we get:
Removing the conditioning and observing that |R 1 | and |R 2 | are independent random variables,
The conditions on m(n) guarantee that the right hand side in the above inequality approaches 1 in the limit as n → ∞. The proof of the second part (converse) of Theorem 3.4 is straightforward. Let E * j , denote the eavesdropper with the maximum fading coefficient to the source S. When m(n) = exp 2cγnτ (n) + Further, we know that |R 1 | ≤ 2nτ (n). Applying Chernoff bounds, we obtain
B. Collaborating Eavesdroppers
In this section, we consider the case where the eavesdroppers can collaborate. Importantly, this also models the case where a single eavesdropper with m antennas is present in the environment.
, and nτ (n) → ∞ as n → ∞, then
out → 1. The total signal-to-noise ratio (C S,E ):
Using Chernoff bounds as in the independent eavesdropper case, |R 1 |,|R 2 | can be lower bounded by
w.h.p.; hence, the combined signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdroppers can be upperbounded w.h.p.:
From Markov's Inequality and straightforward probability:
which goes to zero provided that
C. Discussion
First, consider choice of the threshold τ (n). A large value of τ (n) results in more noise-generating nodes and drives more eavesdroppers into outage. However, this also increases the probability the source to destination link is in outage. Thus, pick the largest τ (n) which allows both R j * and D to decode the message w.h.p. From Section III-A, we know that |h S,R j * | 2 and |h R j * , D| 2 each converge to ln n/2 a.s. A simple calculation based on the SINR requirements for the S → R j * and R j * → D links yields:
Based on the conditions for m(n) in Theorems 3.4 and 3.3, we observe that:
Es n ln n−2nNoγ 16γ
for the non-collaborating eavesdroppers case, and
for the case of collaborating eavesdroppers. In other words, for a given τ (n), we can allow exponentially more non-collaborating eavesdroppers as compared to collaborating eavesdroppers. Further, when eavesdroppers do not collaborate, the number of allowable eavesdroppers grows exponentially in the square root of the number of system nodes.
D. Analysis:Equal Path Loss
In this section, we analyze the protocol described in Section III by making the simplifying physical-layer assumption of equal path loss between any pair of nodes in the network.
We will assume the the messaging relay employs a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) on the packet and, hence, is able to tell whether a packet is correct before relaying. Given this assumption, a source to destination broadcast is in outage if and only if either the S → R * link or the R * → D falls below the required signal-tonoise ratio γ for a given rate; that is,
In contrast to the destination, we will assume the pessimistic case that each eavesdropper can hear both the source and relay transmission with (at least) equal average strength, and below we will also consider cases where an eavesdropper has an even more significant advantage to model a near-far scenario. Each eavesdropper E j sees effectively two independent looks at the source message, and, hence, in the case of hearing two transmissions of equal strength, has an outage probability of:
Obviously, the form of (7) as a function of the observed signal-to-noise ratios is quite superior to (6), but we will observe that the multi-user diversity advantage will offset this effect in areas of operational interest.
E. Asymptotically Large Number of Relays
For any fixed threshold γ, multi-user diversity in the form of relay selection without the introduction of artificial noise is sufficient to drive the outage probability of the source to destination link to zero as n → ∞; however, the eavesdropper outage is invariant to n and thus non-zero. This could be remedied by letting γ go to infinity as n → ∞. For example, it is straightforward to show that for a selection of γ = log log n, P out → 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m as n → ∞ without any system nodes generating artificial noise, but this would require infinite rate on each link and thus is infeasible for practice. Artificial noise generation offers an alternate route that can be employed for fixed γ (or rate), γ > 1, as demonstrated here, and it will be shown to also be effective for moderate n.
Let C S,Ej denote the signal to noise and interference ratio (SINR) from source S to eavesdropper E j . Let P S,E out denote probability of the event (C S,Ej < γ ∧ · · · ∧ C S,E m(n) < γ) i.e. the probability that none of the eavesdropper nodes exceeds the required signal-tonoise-plus-intereference ratio of γ. We assume equal path loss between each pair of nodes. Further, we choose the threshold τ (n) = Es ln n−2Noγ 4nγ
. It follows that P (S→D) out → 0 and
, for some constant c > 1.
Proof: First, we upper bound P (S→D) out , as given in (6), by:
where
, with R j * as the relay with index j that maximizes min{|h S,Rj | 2 , |h Rj ,D | 2 }, basic probability establishes that X = max(X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X N −1 ), where X j = min{|h S,Rj | 2 , |h Rj ,D | 2 }, is the maximum of N iid random variables, each with probability density function:
We next state an important result from extreme value theory, which will be useful in proving Theorem 3.4. We refer the interested reader to [1] [pp.176-177] for more details.
Lemma 3.5: Let Y 1 , · · · , Y n be a sequence of n iid exponential random variables, each having an exponential tailF (y) ∼ Ke −ay where K, a > 0. Let
From Lemma 3.5, we conclude that the random variable X = max(X 1 , · · · , X n ) converges almost surely to ln n/2. In driving the P S→D out to 0, the choice of τ , the threshold for the fading between a system node and the messaging relay below which that node will generate noise, is critical. We write it here as τ (n) to emphasize its selection as a function of n. For a relay node R j ,
τ (n), for small values of τ (n). In other words, each of the n relay nodes has a probability τ (n) of acting as a noise generating node independent of other nodes. Thus, the number of noise generating nodes, denoted by the random variable |R 1 |, is a binomial random variable with mean nτ (n). |R 1 |. We can now use Chernoff bounds [5] [pp.67-70] to obtain bounds on the probability that |R 1 | deviates from its expectation. In particular,
Since τ (n) = Es ln n−2Noγ 4nγ
, it follows that nτ (n) → ∞ as n → ∞. Thus, it is clear from the Chernoff bounds that (n/2)τ (n) ≤ |R 1 | ≤ 2nτ (n) w.h.p. Therefore,
It can be readily seen that P S→D out → 0 as n → ∞. We next show that P (S,E) out → 1. We first obtain a bound on P (S→Ej ) out for a given j. From Lemma 3.5, we know that the maximum of the fading coefficients from the eavesdroppers to the source converges to ln m(n) a.s.
Based on the conditions for m(n), we obtain
We next bound the sum k∈R1 |h R k ,Ej | 2 E s in the denominator. In particular, we show that
w.h.p. Thus, pessimistically assuming n/2 τ (n) noise generating nodes, we observe that
2 -stage Erlang random variable with mean nτ (n) 2 . From Appendix A, we obtain
By symmetry, P S,Ej
is the same for all eavesdropper nodes. Using the union bound, we get:
Removing the conditioning and observing that P (A) ≥ P (A ∩ B) for any two events A and B,
The above goes to 1 in the limit as n → ∞. The proof of the second part of Theorem 3.4 is straightforward. Let E * j , denote the eavesdropper with the maximum fading coefficient to the source S. When m(n) = exp 2cγnτ (n) + Further, we know that |R 1 | ≤ 2nτ (n). Using Chernoff bounds for a 2nτ (n)-stage Erlang random variable, as described in Appendix A, we obtain
Since c < e c−1 for c > 1, it follows that
In other words,
IV. NETWORK CASE
We now consider the more general case of a network of n nodes distributed uniformly and independently at random in a 2D plane of unit area. Further, there are m(n) passive eavesdroppers also distributed uniformly and independently at random inside the 2D plane. We next prove that the network can provide each node with a throughput λ(n) = K(n ln n)
, under the fading model described in Section ??. Our proof is based on the construction proposed in [7] , in which the authors investigate the asymptotic behavior of the capacity of 2D random networks as the number of nodes n approaches infinity, but in the absence of eavesdroppers.
A. Lattice Construction
We divide the unit square {(x, y) : − We first state an important lemma that uniformly bounds the number of nodes in each cell. A similar lemma is presented in [7] and the lemma below only slightly modifies the constants in the bound. Let N i be the number of nodes in cell c i . Then:
Lemma 4.1:
Proof: The probability that a node belongs to cell c i is 
Similarly,
where δ > 0 and f (δ) = (1 + δ) ln(1 + δ) − δ. Thus,
To uniformly bound the number of nodes per cell for all cells, we use the union bound. In particular, for any set of events E 1 , · · · , E n :
Based on Lemma 4.1, we can conclude that a large enough choice of constant k 1 (for instance, k 1 > 8), ensures that each cell has between k1 ln n 2 and 2k 1 ln n nodes w.h.p.
B. Routing of Messages
As described in [7] , each packet is forwarded from a node to another node which is either in the same cell or is in a neighboring cell. In particular, the following routing protocol is followed by each node: 1) A message is forwarded along cells whose xcoordinate is same as the x-coordinate of the source, until the message arrives at a cell whose y-coordinate is the same as that of the destination. 2) The message is then routed along the cells whose y-coordinate is the same as that of the destination, until it arrives at the cell in which the destination node is located.
In each of the intermediate cells, the node with the maximum fading coefficient to the immediately upstream node is chosen to act as the relay node. The choice of the relays is significantly different from that employed in [7] , where a random node is chosen from each intermediate cell to act as a relay. However, the choice of relay nodes based on fading coefficients does not affect the number of streams arriving at a cell as derived in [7] . In particular, we state the following lemma which bounds the number of streams arriving at a cell. The interested reader can refer to [7] for the proof, which again uses Chernoff bounds and union bound. Let S i be the number of streams arriving at cell c i . Then: Lemma 4.2:
C. Time Division Multiplexed Scheduling Scheme
We finally describe a time division multiplexed scheme for scheduling transmissions by nodes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A simple and easily implemented protocol for secret communication between a source and destination using a messaging relay and artificial noise transmitted from a set of intervening system nodes has been presented. The system exploits a multi-user effect in selecting both the messaging relay and the nodes for noise generation. The proposed protocol can provide for a significant advantage for the desired receiver over the eavesdropper that can then be exploited by higher layer protocols to enforce security on the link.
Extension of the analysis in the paper to the network case is currently under investigation. Incorporating a more relaxed outage metric which allows a non-zero outage probability for the source while guaranteeing outage for the eavesdroppers is also being studied.
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APPENDIX A CHERNOFF BOUNDS FOR ERLANG RANDOM VARIABLE
We derive a probability bound on the lower tail of an n-stage Erlang random variable X. Using Chernoff bounds for a non-negative random variable, P (X < a) ≤ inf t<0 e −ta M X (t)
where M X (t) = E[e tX ] denotes the moment generating function of the random variable X. For an n-stage Erlang random variable X with rate λ: M X (t) = λ λ − t n Using elementary calculus, the value of t that minimizes the right hand side of (9) can be obtained as: The probability bound for the upper tail can be derived similarly. In particular, for a non-negative random variable X and a > 0, we have
Proceeding exactly in the same manner as before, it can be easily shown that P (X > γE[X]) ≤ γ e γ−1 n For γ > 1, the right hand side goes to 0 as n → ∞.
